This paper, while paying attention to those issues, will also suggest that strategic and geopolitical interests played a part in the support for oceanography. During the 1940s military patronage helped redefine the role and objectives of American oceanography; as a result, the study of coral reefs, a topic of theoretical inquiry before the war, took on new and additional meanings.
The Navy and Oceanography Before World War II
The navy has had a long history of supporting science. In the nineteenth century the navy backed the United States Exploring Expedition, and in later years promoted Matthew Fontaine Maury's pathbreaking work in physical oceanography. During World War I the Naval Consulting Board sponsored efforts to develop underwater listening devices, and in the 1920s the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) included several 3 scientists, most notably Harvey C. Hayes, who studied underwater sound. In those years
Hayes developed an improved sonic depth finder as well as a viable echo ranging (sonar) system. He also spearheaded an effort, which included scientists from several government agencies, to establish an oceanographic office within the navy. That effort failed for lack of financial support, but Hayes and his colleagues continued their investigations and experiments on echo ranging instruments. Their work emphasized improving the equipment and devoted little attention to understanding the medium within which the equipment operated.5
The navy also showed some interest in the principal oceanographic centers in the United States: the Scripps Institution of Oceanography (SIO) in La Jolla, California, and the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution (WHOI) in Woods Hole , Massachusetts. In the 1930s, both were small, isolated institutions, each with staffs of about a dozen people, one ship, and limited research facilities. Both also relied on private philanthropy. SIO, a division of the University of California, received almost half its support from the Scripps family, while the Rockefeller Foundation provided most of the funding for Woods Hole.
The navy, by contrast, provided direct sponsorship only for projects to develop antifouling methods for protection of ships' hulls.6 It did, however, support those institutions in other ways. The directors of WHOI and SIO, Henry Bryant Bigelow and Thomas Wayland Vaughan, developed good working relationships with the Hydrographic Office (HO), the principal government agency for the publication of navigational guides and charts worldwide. Through arrangements with the Navy Hydrographer, Rear Admiral Walter R. Gherardi, that agency provided both institutions with seawater temperature, salinity, and dynamic sounding data. The Hydrographic Office also allowed Scripps' 4 scientists to conduct research onboard its vessels, and in the 1930s two graduate students, Richard H. Fleming and Roger Revelle, spent several months collecting data in the Caribbean and Pacific.7 While the Naval Research Laboratory and the Hydrographic Office supported work on sonar and navigation, opportunities for science in the navy remained limited. To the navy the oceans were the environment in which its forces operated, and an emphasis on operational doctrine and engineering dominated. In the 1930s, when the navy cosponsored an expedition to measure gravity at sea, it was primarily interested in staying abreast of any new technological developments related to the oceans.8 The Hydrographic Office permitted its crews to assist the oceanographic institutions by gathering data and taking soundings, but only as "a side line, . . . because of the difficulty of diverting ships or men from other jobs." When Bigelow and Vaughan requested additional commitments, including a ship exclusively for oceanographic work, the navy declined.9
Oceanographers, by contrast, defined their field broadly. Vaughan and Bigelow, for example, did not consider oceanography a specific discipline. Rather it was the study of a particular place, the oceans, and oceanographers employed the knowledge, techniques and methods from geology, biology, physics, and chemistry to study that medium. They were well aware of the practical and commercial aspects of the science and pointed out how oceanography could contribute to the search for oil, development of fisheries, and weather forecasting. Yet in 1936 even Revelle, who had spent two summers onboard navy vessels and become an officer in the Naval Reserve, admitted that Prior to Iselin's work few scientists had studied problems of underwater sound transmission. Physicists rarely had access to the equipment necessary for such investigations. Nor had the subject attracted the attention of oceanographers. In the 1920s and 30s American oceanographers became increasingly interested in physical oceanography, including the new dynamical studies coming out of Norway. At Woods Hole Bigelow, Iselin, and Edward Smith studied the works of Vilhelm Bjerknes, and in 1936 Harald Sverdrup, a student of Bjerknes and a leading physical oceanographer in his own right, emigrated from Norway to become the new director of Scripps. But those developments did not immediately lead to research on underwater sound. Sverdrup's first 6 investigations at SIO, studies of water circulation off the California coast, followed the methods of dynamical oceanography. He and Fleming analyzed currents, circulation patterns, and upwelling in relation to other oceanographic and meteorological factors.
They did not study underwater sound transmission. Iselin's early researches were similar, until work with the navy led him in a new and different direction. 12 Iselin pursued opportunities in that new field on several fronts. He expressed interest in the work of Maurice Ewing, a geophysicist at Lehigh University who was using explosives for underwater sound tests. In the hands of geophysicists seismic refraction studies constituted an important tool in the search for oil; for Ewing they were a means for examining the earth's structure beneath the sea. Although Bigelow hesitated when Ewing asked permission to carry out such tests at WHOI, Iselin recognized an additional means for studying underwater sound transmission and by 1940 Ewing was a member of the staff. 13 Iselin's initiative also stimulated instrument development. In Iselin's research had defined temperature and pressure as the two main variables influencing underwater sound transmission, and the BT became the instrument for studying the behavior of sound in seawater.14 Research on underwater sound required access to sonar, submarines, and surface vessels, and Iselin developed good relations with the NRL, the Bureau of Ships, and the submarine command at New London. For the navy, especially the NRL and the Bureau of Ships, the operational performance of echo ranging equipment, namely its capability of detecting submarines, was the top priority. Iselin and Ewing's efforts convinced navy Oceanographers had long relied on instrumentation to study an alien environment not accessible by direct observation. In the context of World War II, however, research served the purpose of testing, evaluating, and improving the operational effectiveness of instruments and weapons. Such objectives fostered much scientific investigation, but as 11 Colpitts, the second in command of Division 6 noted, even fundamental studies were carried out "to understand better the operation of present gear and to be able to design better gear." Lyman Spitzer, one of the chief physicists in Division 6, lamented that sonar analysis was far from actual scientific research, while Eckart admitted to being relieved when the title of projects in his division changed from "fundamental research" to "sonar operations research," since he had actually discouraged fundamental research.25
Those priorities characterized the work done on underwater sound transmission.
Equipment performance at sea had first led the NRL to contact Woods Hole in the late 1930s, and equipment performance remained the guiding principle for work on underwater sound in subsequent years. In early 1941 Iselin and Ewing completed a report entitled "Sound Transmission in Sea Water." The study was designed to convince navy officers and scientists that physical factors influenced underwater sound transmission. Emphasizing that sound waves were generally refracted in seawater, the authors indicated how temperature, pressure, and, to a lesser extent, salinity affected the horizontal and vertical velocity of sound. Based on experiments conducted at Guantanamo Bay and Key West, Florida, they demonstrated that behavior of sound waves in seawater varied by location, time of day, and season of the year. Iselin and Ewing wanted support for further scientific research on underwater sound, but they also recognized that their work had to contribute to the navy's practical, operational objectives. Again and again their report highlighted how scientific knowledge, particularly an understanding of conditions that could produce positive or negative vertical velocity gradients, had consequences for echo ranging performance. When NRL and the Bureau of Ships agreed to support a program of research, it was largely because 12 Iselin's two years' experience walking the halls in Washington and the decks of navy vessels had taught him how to sell science to the navy on the navy's terms. 26 The development of slide rules and sound ranging (sonar) charts illustrates the same point. During 1941, as the navy installed BTs on ships in the Atlantic and Pacific, scientists at WHOI and UCDWR started receiving thousands of BT slides.
Oceanographers at both institutions began considering means for computing echo ranges and making echo range predictions from BT data. Independently, Ewing at WHOI and Revelle and Fleming at Point Loma developed slides rules for that purpose. By early 1942 they were also constructing charts showing sound ranging conditions in strategic locations. The differences between the two slide rules were minimal, but both the navy and NDRC recognized the importance of having only one instrument and one standardized chart. When conferences between the oceanographers failed to produce a compromise or an agreement on which slide rule to use, other scientists were called in to adjudicate. Ewing's circular slide rule became the instrument of choice, but that was not the sole issue at hand. Sonar and the BT had stimulated research and invention, but for the navy operational objectives were the top priority. Standardization of the slide rule and sound ranging charts was necessary since their primary purpose was to inform ships' officers and sonar operators whether conditions were good for detecting or evading submarines.27
The development of BT prediction manuals served the same objective. As Oreskes's paper (this volume) indicates, BT studies led scientists to a more refined understanding of the thermocline, layer effect, and other features of underwater acoustics.
For the navy it was especially important to apply that information for use in tactical The need for harbor protection likewise promoted work in oceanography. The navy had previously developed various harbor protection instruments, including hydrophones, sono-radio buoys, and magnetic and acoustic cable systems. In contrast to sonar these were passive listening devices for detecting ships, submarines, or weapons Revelle, who oversaw work on surf forecasting, also took charge of another HO project to collect information on beaches, shorelines, and coasts that would aid in amphibious operations. The navy turned to scientists at UCDWR and SIO to undertake studies on slope, composition, erosion, and "trafficability" of beaches and inshore environments. By 1945 the navy was calling on other agencies, such as the U.S.
Geological Survey, to transfer scientists with a knowledge of oceanography and geophysics to those laboratories. Scientists there also worked closely with the navy and with engineers from the University of California, Berkeley to determine which locations, which kind of craft, and which surf conditions were best for making landings and securing beachheads.39 19 World War II thus brought considerable change to American oceanography. Navy interests fostered a wide range of scientific investigations which served primarily to improve instruments and weapons for use in military operations. In contrast to prewar oceanography, which encouraged work in all fields, subsurface and amphibious warfare emphasized physical, chemical, and geological oceanography. Underwater sound, a subject that previously had received no attention, became a top priority. Conversely, biological studies, a mainstay of prewar oceanography, largely disappeared with the exception of analyses of marine animal sounds that affected echo ranging performance.40
The concern for developing predictive models, whether for underwater acoustics or sea, swell, and surf forecasting, reinforced the emphasis on physical science. Wartime activities took oceanographers farther and deeper than they had gone before. While Scientists, however, had mixed feelings about an ongoing relationship. Many understood the navy's interest, but few wanted to remain involved in war related work. 22 Oceanographers made that point at a January 1945 meeting on demobilization. Iselin, Sverdrup, Fleming, and Spitzer agreed that after the war the oceanographic unit in the Hydrographic Office should be expanded and become the center for naval oceanography.
Yet they also stated:
the civilian oceanographic laboratories should serve mainly as consultants to the Hydrographic Office in problems of pure science and should undertake work under Navy sponsorship only where experience in broad fundamental research is required to aid in obtaining results of ultimate practical significance. It should be their function to explore such problems as are more or less remote from the immediate routine of the Navy laboratories and to maintain a pool of qualified personnel which can be drawn on as necessary by the Navy.
Eager to return to research, and wary about issues of secrecy, ability to publish, and the increased costs and bureaucracy that would accompany military support, those scientists sought to distance themselves from navy operations.46
Yet Sverdrup, Iselin, and their colleagues also realized that oceanography could not do without the navy. The navy could provide greater financial support than any other entity; it also maintained control of vessels and instruments that were necessary for deep sea research. Oceanographers, in short, needed the navy as much as the navy needed to discover new principles which control our environment and new natural resources, and two, for the purposes of waging war, In some cases these two purposes are entirely inseparable. It has become apparent that the society which knows the most about its environment and how to turn it to account, is going to be the more likely to win the next war.52
For the purpose of fighting and winning any future wars, the military needed to obtain extensive knowledge about the environments in which such wars would be waged, be it on land, in the sea, or under the sea. That knowledge was important for developing predictive models for waging war anytime, anywhere. It was also important for control.
In addition to beachheads, islands and atolls, underwater formations and underwater sound channels were vital territorial resources that needed to be controlled.
Oceanography, as a field science, contributed to that objective. In the case of the Bikini Scientific Resurvey, and much of postwar oceanography, scientific, military, and geopolitical purposes were inseparable. The consensus achieved could be defined as a symbiotic relationship, but is perhaps better understood as a form of embedding. Recognizing that navy concerns were paramount, scientists sought to carve out a niche for their interests, but in a manner that would also serve military objectives.54
The dual role that scientists played is evident in the postwar activities that took place at Bikini. The resurvey was a navy sponsored expedition that enabled oceanographers to conduct research on questions that they deemed important. Military patronage may even have enhanced the scientific work done at Bikini. Operating under navy auspices, scientists had access to the latest and best equipment. The navy's multiple needs and demands, from underwater acoustics to bottom topography, required that expeditions include scientists from many fields. The opportunities for oceanographers to work with physicists, geophysicists, and engineers in isolated, labor intensive situations fostered interaction that may have contributed to new discoveries and interpretations.
But scientists also served military needs. Oceanographers and geophysicists took part in Crossroads, even though it was a technical assessment of weapon performance that provided few opportunities for research. The multiple traversals done by Emery and Tracey on the resurvey had little to do with the study of coral reef formation. Rather they provided detailed information on how to access, cross, and establish beachheads on reefs.
Harry Ladd complained that using loran to establish ship positions was difficult and "of 
